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hank nelsonIntroductIon
Various Pacific Island states have been 
labelled ‘at-risk’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘dysfunctional’, 
‘broken-backed’, collapsed, ‘failing’ and ‘failed’.2 
While some of these terms have been around for 
over forty years, and attempts have been made 
to define them, they remain imprecise and have 
little explanatory value. They have particular 
disadvantages when applied in the southwest 
Pacific.
In so far as they have become part of social 
science jargon, they have generally originated 
elsewhere and are of doubtful descriptive 
value when applied to the diversity within all 
Melanesian states. There is simply no uniform 
‘weakness’ or ‘risk’ or ‘failure’ across government 
departments, levels of government or regions. 
Even where quantitative measures have been 
introduced into the definitions, they remain 
arbitrary. The blanket descriptions offend island 
governments, especially those struggling to 
carry out reforms declared essential by outside 
agencies.
The most significant failure of these labels 
is that while they attempt to describe a stage 
reached in a process, they say nothing about what 
that process is, what causes it and what forces 
might accelerate it, slow it down or reverse it. 
Some terms have, of course, been devised to be 
decorous or diplomatic: they are as precise and 
analytical as saying ‘things are a bit crook’.
The first of these terms that I became aware 
of was the ‘broken backed state’. It was a term 
used by Hugh Tinker in 1964, but became 
well known in Port Moresby in 1967 when 
the magazine, New Guinea, republished Tinker’s 
article. Forty years on, much of what Tinker 
said still seems prescient (Tinker 1967). Tinker 
said that the granting of independence to those 
colonies prepared for it had begun with India 
and the Philippines and had ended with Malaya 
and Nigeria. From then, independence had been 
granted to the unready. Tinker claimed that in the 
mid 1960s even the prepared countries in Africa 
were struggling, and for those that followed the 
prospects were grim. Tinker disagreed with those 
who thought the alternatives were Communism, 
military dictatorship or rabble-rousing despotism. 
The more likely outcome, Tinker thought, was 
the ‘broken backed state’. That, he said, was 
already the case in the Congo where a wounded 
state persisted in spite of ‘massive intervention’ 
by the United Nations, and he also drew on what 
had happened in Burma. He pointed out that 
rebellions had occurred in Burma, governments 
had changed and the military intervened, but bits 
of the rebellions persisted and the military and 
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other governments were not strong enough to 
impose their rule across the country. Tinker went 
on to give some characteristics of the broken 
backed state in which there was a government 
in the capital, it was recognised internationally, 
it had an economic plan (analysed at length by 
postgraduates), and passed some ‘enlightened 
legislation’ (that had no influence any distance 
from the capital), government services were 
poor (half the letters posted got delivered), and 
through much of the countryside there were 
competing political bosses, bandits who levied 
tribute, and detachments of the police and the 
army who behaved like the other contending 
forces. The broken backed state emerged, Tinker 
argued, not out of a dramatic collapse of the 
former state, but gradually, and it could persist. 
The broken backed state, Tinker said, was a 
‘poor thing’, but within communities, religion, 
magic, tradition, family and clan continued to 
be important. People could survive, and that was 
something.3
I have drawn attention to the broken backed 
state because I want to emphasise just how long 
this sort of labelling and its associated debate has 
been around. It precedes by a decade the granting 
of independence in Melanesia. I also like Hugh 
Tinker’s comments because of the relevance 
of four characteristics of the states that he 
describes; firstly they are not necessarily getting 
any better or worse; secondly, they can last in 
their inefficient way for a long time; thirdly, they 
can vary from areas of warfare (but not always the 
same areas), to regions of peace and prosperity; 
and fourthly the basic weaknesses apply across 
institutions so that a change in government 
by election or takeover by civilian or army 
dictator is unlikely to solve anything because the 
incoming government will bring with it many of 
the deficiencies of the previous government, and 
will inherit the same defective institutions. For 
the same reason, the deployment of police and 
army units to solve problems in particular areas 
is unlikely to be successful: the army and police 
will suffer from the problems of supply, transport, 
discipline and accountability that afflict other 
sections of government.
The aim, here, is not to take labels generated 
elsewhere and apply them in Melanesia, but to 
start in the region and define the significant 
characteristics of governments and states. The 
comments have been grouped under sub-headings 
in the hope that these will not only help describe 
what is actually taking place, but also give some 
indication of the diversity and complexity of the 
processes at work. The use of new categories is 
not a repackaging of the old in new wrappers; it 
is not intended to give the impression that the 
current position in Melanesia is cause for greater 
hope or alarm than previously conveyed; and 
it may still be appropriate at times to call some 
states ‘weak’ or ‘failed’; but it is hoped that the 
categories used are more relevant to the region 
and give a more accurate impression of a varied 
and dynamic situation. Most examples are taken 
from Papua New Guinea, the largest and most 
populous of the Melanesian states, and the one 
I know best. The comments are most likely to 
have relevance to Solomons, Vanuatu and West 
Papua.
the optIonal state
Within ten years of independence, Tabara 
village on the mid Gira River in the west of Oro 
Province had few obvious connections to the 
outside world. Travel was by river or walking 
track, there was no store and no cash was used in 
daily exchanges. There was no school teacher and 
the small aid post had no supplies. Government 
officers made no regular visits. While Tabara 
was enclosed within the geographic area of the 
nation of Papua New Guinea, the state of Papua 
New Guinea had withdrawn from Tabara. Nearly 
all decisions about law and order, communal 
fencing of gardens against pigs, and other group 
activities that might involve more than one 
family were made within the village. If people 
wished to use the services of the state they had to 
leave the village. That was an option. But it was 
an option more likely to be exercised by some 
rather than others. Middle aged and older women 
rarely left the village — or went beyond other 
villages equally outside the state — and families 
that already had members in paid employment 
in Popondetta or Port Moresby could travel 
knowing that they would be looked after at the 
end of the journey, and be given the cash for a 
fare home. Such families were more likely to send 
children to secondary school — they could raise 
the fees and the children would have somewhere 
to stay while at school. So because of their age, 
gender and connections, some people enter the 
state from time to time, and some of the young 
people will make a long term commitment to stay 
within those areas administered by the state; but 
for all people in Tabara to enter the state and use 
its services is to exercise choice.
Those people living beyond the reach of the 
state are not only people in scattered and isolated 
communities. They include some communities 
on small islands and on the larger islands such 
as New Britain, as well as in various parts 
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and rebels take over some of the functions of 
the state in a limited area or for a particular 
service. The Japanese might build a school or 
hook Kundiawa to broadband internet service. 
Australian Apexians might build a hospital or 
a Polish community provide equipment for the 
Modilon Hospital in Madang or an aid agency 
take over a function of a government department 
such as the supply of certain medicines; but more 
significant are those areas where virtually all 
government services are controlled by another 
authority. The case of the Pomio Kivung in East 
New Britain has become well-known since the 
release in 2005 of Gary Kildea’s and Andrea 
Simon’s film, Koriam’s Law — and the dead who 
govern. The anthropologist, Andrew Lattas, has 
provided detail and perspective on the Pomio 
movement (Lattas). The Kivung predates 
Independence by over a decade so it was not a 
reaction to a failure of the national government, 
but a response to obvious inequalities in apparent 
knowledge, wealth and prestige of the villagers 
in their relationships with government, church 
and the global economy. The Kivung does not 
exclude the representatives of the government 
or the mission; but as the film reveals, they are 
not treated as the sources of real knowledge or 
power. Like many other such movements, the 
Pomio Kivung is, to an outsider, a mixing of 
the rational and irrational: the members are not 
simply waiting for the return of the dead and 
revelation, but are working to improve their 
material lives. By contrast another well-known 
area that has run a parallel regime, Me’ekamui on 
Bougainville, has been a ‘no-go zone’. Me’ekamui 
has its own armed force and it has controlled 
who has entered its enclave; but its proclaimed 
purpose seems to have varied, perhaps indicating 
divisions within its ranks as well as changes over 
time. Some recent statements have indicated 
that it had no aim to overthrow the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government and it claims to be 
supporting the ABG in ‘maintaining peace and 
harmony in Bougainville’ (Post Courier, 3 April 
2006). Whatever its long-term aims, it is an 
example of the longevity of the remnants of 
rebellion in states where the reach of the central 
government is limited.
Palm oil and logging companies have been 
building their own infrastructures and providing, 
or promising to provide, other services, but most 
of all the mining companies have become de facto 
governments in the immediate area of the mine 
and the source of funds for governments beyond 
the immediate mine site. While the building of 
infrastructure is a precondition for mining and 
it is in the self-interest of the company to ensure 
of mainland Papua New Guinea. These are 
not necessarily people where the level of tribal 
fighting has forced the withdrawal of public 
servants and has made it difficult for police to 
enter the area unless they go in force and heavily 
armed.
The extent to which state services — in 
effect the state — has withdrawn is apparent 
in a statement by Transparency International 
on health services in Papua New Guinea. In 
February 2006 it said that only about half of the 
medical aid posts operating thirty years ago were 
then working, and where it had been government 
policy to ensure that no one walked more than 
four hours to an aid post, some people were 
walking four days to reach medical help (Post-
Courier, 6 Feb 2006).4
the Incomplete state
It follows that there are many areas with just 
one or two government services — the people 
live in an incomplete state. Even measured 
against the limited benefits provided by the Papua 
New Guinea state, most people live without 
any convenient communication system (post, 
telephone or electronic) or connection to a state 
supplied electricity system or water service; a 
quarter of the people of primary school age have 
no school; and over two-thirds of the population 
do not have access to the first four years of 
secondary school. They also lack those services 
that come with a developed economy, such as a 
bank and easy access to a market for the produce 
that they fly, ship and truck to markets.
The incomplete state is not generally a result 
of the withdrawal of government services over 
the last thirty years. While some services may 
have declined, some, such as the provision of 
schools, have expanded. The number of students 
in school may have doubled in the decade from 
1992, from just over half a million to a million 
(The Contribution of Australian Aid, p.34). The 
colonial and post-colonial states have always 
offered few services and a minority have benefited 
from all of the few services.
the alternate state
Citizens wanting government services and 
foreign governments and aid agencies needing 
a way to deliver assistance have looked for 
alternatives to inefficient or absent government 
services. Cults, churches, mining companies, 
palm oil plantations, non-government agencies 
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good relations with local communities, much of 
the cost of providing community services is offset 
against tax credits or holidays. The Porgera Joint 
Venture has claimed to provide ‘roads, classrooms, 
hospitals and health centres, and miscellaneous 
facilities such as fishing cooperatives and libraries’ 
(Thomsen). It has also built centres to train local 
workers and enable villagers to develop businesses 
to take advantage of the presence of the mine. In 
Western Province, Ok Tedi Mining (OTM) says 
that its training institute at Tabubil has been so 
successful that Australian companies short of 
skilled workers have been poaching their trainees 
(Weekend Australian 1-2 April 2006). The impact 
of OTM’s health services in the mine area has 
been spectacular, the infant death rate declining 
from 160 per 1000 to 17 per 1000 by 1993, and 
is now much better than the national average. 
Although the mines may have had a deleterious 
impact on those who suffer from waste in their 
streams — and it is devastating on some Fly 
River communities — those who live in the area 
where a mine has taken over services are likely 
to be better off than others in the district. In 
addition, OTM says it has been paying millions 
to the Western Province government. It has had 
almost no visible impact. An OTM director said 
that nearly all money goes into salaries and the 
rest just disappears: ‘We’ll put two million kina 
into a bank account and it has all gone two 
days later. There is no explanation about where 
it goes’ (Weekend Australian, 1-2 April 2006). 
Greater amounts from the oil and gas projects 
have disappeared with the same rapidity in the 
Southern Highlands. One calculation by Samuel 
Koyma has some K741 million going to the 
Southern Highlands province and landowners 
between 1992 and 2001 and leaving little trace 
(Post-Courier, 25 May 2002). When listed it is 
obvious that the mining companies are widely 
distributed and have had, and are having, an 
impact on many people: Ok Tedi, Porgera, oil 
and gas ventures in the Southern Highlands 
and Gulf, Kainantu, Ramu nickel, Tolukuma 
(Central province), Bougainville Copper, Lihir 
and smaller projects and prospects.
As providers of education and health services, 
opportunities to advance in a regional institution 
and a means to connect with and explain the 
material and non-material world, the churches 
have long been cooperating and competing with 
the secular state. In 1963, before the unification 
of the education system, there were 38,000 Papua 
New Guineans in government primary schools 
and 109,000 in mission schools (Currie Report, 
pp.307 and 315). At times the Administration 
thought it was dealing with a collection of 
theocracies: for many people mission affiliation 
was more important in group identification than 
residence in a district, and mission shipping 
and mission-promoted ventures into the cash 
economy were part of the comprehensive 
approach of the churches.5 The extent to which 
even the smaller missions operated in isolation 
is apparent in their reminiscences, for example 
in Marjorie Deasey’s account of a working life-
time in the Unevangelised Field Mission at 
Gogodala (Deasey). But the recent history of 
the churches has been dynamic and complex. 
Some of the older missions, such as the London 
Missionary Society and the Methodists (who 
provided the foundation for the United Church) 
and the Anglicans were more inclined to hand 
authority to Papua New Guineans while the 
various Catholic missions and the Seventh Day 
Adventists retained many foreign ordained and 
lay staff. More significant have been an increasing 
number of churches that have members being 
involved in various charismatic or pentecostalist 
movements. Thousands have attended crusades 
in the main towns, members of parliament have 
proclaimed themselves born again, and forms 
of the evangelism have penetrated villages 
from the New Guinea islands to the Highlands. 
Betty Scarlet, who had been with the United 
Church for a decade from 1962, returned after 
a seven year absence to a ‘cool reception’ where 
the foreign missionaries at the Port Moresby 
Missionary Home were interested only in ‘Faith 
Missions’ (Scarlet). Richard Eves has written of 
the implications of pentecostalist beliefs and the 
state, including the tendency to see a break down 
in law and order, deteriorating roads and the 
spread of AIDS as fulfilment of prophesy, rather 
than as failures of politicians and public servants 
(Eves p.535). The churches remain politically 
important and dominant in civil society, but the 
coherence of the old theocracies has declined as 
church representatives have lost influence with 
the drunk, violent and indifferent; some church 
administrations have become less efficient; and 
their theologies have been challenged by the 
emotional evangelism of the ‘born again’.
In April 2006 in Enga all districts except 
one were declared fighting zones. There, and in 
other parts of the Highlands where fighting has 
been intense, local groups or alliances of groups 
have gained dominance. But while the term 
‘warlordism’ has been used to indicate a breaking 
down of the state into areas dominated by leaders 
or communities backed by a local armed force, 
there is little evidence that the warlords have 
aimed to establish their own states — they 
have not systematically censused and taxed and 
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provided services, although they may have taxed 
in the sense that they have set up road blocks and 
taken money and goods from those who passed. 
Most of this appears to be young men operating 
in defiance of traditional leaders. Those relieving 
citizens of cash on the Goroka-Simbu section of 
the Highlands Highway were said to be charging 
K40 for vehicles and K2 for individuals to by-pass 
a landslip. They were drinking from cans of beer 
as they confronted people, and the Chuave police 
who were there were ‘outnumbered and helpless’ 
(National, 28 April 2006).6 The fighting has 
certainly been damaging to the state, forcing the 
withdrawal of public servants, destroying public 
buildings, ending basic services such as medicine 
and education, and of course challenging the 
state’s monopoly of violence. The suggestions 
to develop new provinces such as Hela in the 
Southern Highlands and Jiwaka based on Banz 
in the Western Highlands may be stimulated by 
the local fighting (Jiwaka perhaps in reaction 
to it and Hela threatening to achieve statehood 
in part through violence) but both are aiming 
to be provinces within Papua New Guinea, not 
separate from and alternatives to the present 
state.7 ‘Warlordism’ seems to be an inappropriate 
term: it indicates a stage beyond the endemic 
warfare that is currently damaging the state, but 
is a long way from breaking the state into petty 
fiefdoms, each with its own administration.
For many people in Papua New Guinea, if 
they have a new public building then there is 
a fair chance it has been provided by outside 
donors — so Popondetta received a refurbished 
and equipped high school as a result of a program 
funded by the European Union.8 If a community 
has a new road then it may have funded by a 
company or a donor. (From1975 to 2000 Australia 
paid three times as much on road maintenance as 
the Papua New Guinea government)(AusAID, 
The Contribution of Australian Aid, p.xii). In 
Madang the interests of donor and company 
coincided when the Chinese government granted 
over K19 million to develop roads because of its 
national interest in the Ramu nickel project. A 
health service may be wholly funded and staffed 
by a church. And in some areas all services 
from policing to anti-malaria campaigns to the 
provision of brass band instruments may come 
from a company, or all services may be provided 
by, and conform with, the politico-religious 
beliefs of the dominant group in the area.
the state wIth dImInIshed 
tradItIonal base
Hugh Tinker assumed that at the local 
level ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’ would make life 
tolerable, and commentators on the Solomons 
and Papua New Guinea have claimed that a 
basic need is to bind the existing village systems 
into the centralised state. That may well be 
desirable, even essential, but what Tinker and 
some commentators have underestimated is the 
extent to which the traditional system would lose 
authority. In the Kotte Local Level Government 
Council area, Finschhafen District, the Merikeo 
Community School with an enrolment of about 
200 was forced to close at the end of 2005. An 
armed gang held up teachers on pay days and 
in one of the worst incidents they walked into 
the school, selected a girl and took her outside 
and several of the gang raped her. The local 
leaders could do little when faced with the 
armed gang, the police said they did not have the 
officers or resources to do anything, and no other 
provincial or national institution was able to 
help. The teachers left. (Post-Courier, 6-8 January 
2005). Those incidents were taking place in an 
area with over one hundred years of Lutheran 
mission influence and where the church and its 
institutions have been strong.
Nabuapaka village on the edge of the Roro 
speaking people to the west of Port Moresby is 
in another area that has known missionaries 
and government officers for over a century. 
Michael Monsell-Davis, who has been visiting 
Nabuapaka for over forty years, explains that 
when he first went there the chiefs of four sub-
clans had customary authority in the village; but 
by 2000 not one of the four had been through 
the traditional installation ceremony, three had 
married women from outside the language group, 
and three did not live in the village, although two 
of them were normally in a nearby settlement. 
The sorcerers who had previously backed the 
sub-chiefs were seen to have reduced powers. 
The church, and its representative, the pastor, 
had slight influence over many of the young. 
None of the new office holders — the magistrate, 
peace officer and councillor — could command 
authority. Villagers complained of drunkenness 
and vandalism. Some young men from the 
Nabuapaka had been involved in armed robbery 
in Port Moresby, and they were said to have used 
home-made guns to rob people on the nearby 
highway. Sub-clans are in danger of breaking 
into nuclear families which have effectively 
withdrawn from the mutual obligations that are 
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a part of sub-clan membership. When people in 
Nabuapaka talk of a decline in law and order, 
they are not referring to national institutions but 
to their own — those that seemed to serve them 
well through much of the twentieth century. 
(Monsell-Davis, pp.121-30).
In the Highlands, cases of declining and 
or changing traditional authority are more 
frequent and more widespread. In the last year of 
Australian administration and while the Somare 
Government was feeling its way into pre-self-
government office, a Committee of Inquiry was 
set up under the chairmanship of Phillip Paney 
to report on the increasing violence in the 
Highlands. The situation was already serious. In 
1972 in the Western Highlands (then including 
Enga) eighteen people had been reported killed 
in tribal fighting, around 280 had been wounded, 
and on ten occasions the police had used gas 
or firearms (Paney, p.38). The Report noted 
that while the resurgence in tribal fighting was 
greatest in the Western Highlands and Chimbu 
there was increased ‘lawlessness’ in the Southern 
and Eastern Highlands. They also said clan 
leaders claimed that unlike in the past the ‘young 
men run riot and the fights get out of control’ 
(Paney, pp.2-3). What was true then has got 
worse. Central to the tragedy revealed in the 
Bob Connolly and Robin Anderson film Black 
Harvest, released in 1992, was the inability of 
Ganiga traditional leaders such as Popina Mai 
to halt the slide into wider and deadlier warfare. 
Writing recently, Connolly thought that between 
150 and 200 had been killed in the Nebilyer area 
south of Mt Hagen (Connolly, p.250). The death 
rates have been higher elsewhere, particularly 
in the Southern Highlands, and the fighting 
has been widespread. An Australian missionary 
reported that in the fighting near Kainantu 
in the Eastern Highlands between the Ifo and 
Fomu groups, fifteen people had been killed in 
three weeks, many assault rifles were being used 
and some twenty-two haus lain (including tens 
of thousands of people) have been involved 
(National, 7 July 2005).
The broad terms such as ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ are 
most concerned with the institutions of central 
government, and so are the strategies of those 
agencies concerned with strengthening the state. 
While the agencies may be aware of varying 
capacities of introduced provincial and local 
level governments to deliver services, there is less 
consciousness of the radical changes that have 
been taking place in traditional systems. Some 
continue to serve their communities well, but in 
many villagers when people regret the breakdown 
in law and order they are talking of the failure 
of the system that thirty years ago ensured law 
and order for most of the people for most of the 
time. The kiap visited most villages once a year 
or so, and while his known ability to intervene 
and his backing for appointed village officials 
was influential, and a Christian mission exercised 
its authority, villagers settled nearly all disputes 
and policed their own rules in their own way. In 
March 2006, long serving leader and president 
of the Yanges Local Level Government in Enga, 
Jack Nema, went to negotiate the surrender of a 
man suspected of being an instigator of a fight, 
but he himself was killed by the suspect’s people 
(National, 12 April 2006). Nema’s traditional 
standing, his office in local government and the 
backing of provincial and central government 
did not protect him. Weakness, fragility and 
failure occur in the traditional systems of village 
government.
the state wIthout clerks
It is not, of course, that there are no clerks. 
In the Papua New Guinea public service of 
around 70,000, there are many. It is a question of 
whether they are present, and whether they have 
any desire or capacity or resources to do their 
work. An editorial in the National made a savage 
attack on the public service, complaining that it 
might take a day to find the appropriate office, 
buildings being without signs or notice board 
and no one seeming to be able to give directions. 
If the office is found it will probably not be 
occupied and when it is, there will be a long 
wait and the answer will be one of ‘Come back 
tomorrow’, ‘Sorry, no funds’ or they have run out 
of the appropriate forms. The editorial claims: 
‘We know of a provincial administration where 
more than 50 percent of the officers employed — 
and we use the term loosely — can be guaranteed 
to be absent on any given weekday’ (National, 
31 September 2004). Perhaps some of this can 
be dismissed as simply the standard criticism 
made of bureaucracies in Canberra, Washington, 
Brussels and Brasilia, but there is much other 
evidence of the failure of government at the 
level of those who answer questions from the 
public; look after files; make, receive and record 
all small payments; manage recurrent costs of 
power, building maintenance and cleaning; order 
stationery, ink for printers and photocopiers; and 
issue permits for trading, vehicle registration, 
liquor licences and building.
In the Education Department teachers may 
go more than seventeen fortnights without pay; 
or the Department might come to believe that 
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number of Australians had actually increased and 
while they held every position except one in the 
First Division, they also dominated in the Second 
Division in positions which were then called 
Clerk Classes six to eleven (Annual Report 1972-
73, p.39). That was just over one year before full 
internal self-government. It was not only that 
executive government and senior members of the 
public service came late and rapidly to office from 
1972, but so did much of the middle rank of the 
public service. The result was little institutional 
memory and few people competent and confident 
in routine practices.
The problems that arise from the absence of 
competent clerks are greater than the frustrations 
suffered by individuals. The anger demonstrated 
by the Daru police who in several incidents 
seized government vehicles, intimidated public 
servants and effectively shut down the provincial 
administration probably had several causes, but 
the one the police spoke about was the delays 
in having the police barracks repaired. Electrical 
faults have resulted in fires and sanitation 
depends on the ‘black bucket’ system which in 
the wet season becomes unworkable and families 
are forced to use their backyards (Post-Courier, 
24-26 Feb and 4 April 2006). Clearly no regular 
maintenance had been carried out, and over 
the months that the police protested about the 
illness and inconvenience that resulted from 
their primitive living conditions there did not 
seem to be anyone able to carry out the necessary 
tasks, even after the district administrator had 
given general authority.
In another recent case the actions of the 
chairman of the Public Service Commission 
has been referred to the Ombudsman and the 
police for further investigation. The allegations 
include numerous over payments and unlawful 
payments in salary and entitlements. In its initial 
investigation, the Public Accounts Committee 
said the overpayments could take place because 
of the ‘poor accounting and record keeping of the 
staff ’ (National, 12 April 06).
The lack of good clerks means that the 
routine work of a department is not done; the 
frustration leads to a further decline in morale; 
and it leaves the way open to corruption. A 
further consequence is that at times of elections 
or political crisis much of the public service ceases 
work. The ministerial staff and the most senior 
members of the public service are concerned with 
the political drama — their careers depend on it 
— and without direction the clerks are even less 
likely to keep government functioning. In these 
circumstances all the more credit is due to those 
middle ranking public servants who do their work 
it could have 6000 teachers on the payroll who 
have in fact officially retired or gone on leave 
and never come back to work or died or simply 
stopped turning up at a school.9 That 6000 is 
about one fifth of the entire teaching service. 
Teachers who are appointed to a new post find 
that the air fare does not turn up, and when they 
enquire the Department shifts them to another 
and closer school, probably because the money 
for the fare is no longer available. Then there 
is the long delay while the new appointment is 
sorted out. Teachers who have been without pay 
or an expected promotion come to a Provincial 
headquarters or Waigani to enquire, but are 
frustrated by the inability of anyone to find a 
file recording their services. When they are at 
their school they suffer from the inability of 
the Department to send supplies at the start 
of the school year, and when the supplies do 
arrive they are likely to be incomplete. Because 
regular maintenance is not carried out, the 
school may close because the water tanks have 
sprung leaks, and the students are left without 
water for drinking or washing. Similar problems 
are apparent in other sections of the government. 
The police certainly suffer from similar minor 
administrative failures of supply, maintenance 
and personnel management. The same appears to 
be true of the Defence Force.
It may be that one of the major shortcomings 
of the Australian administration was its failure 
to train people to work in the middle levels of 
the public service. In the mid-1960s, many basic 
transactions were carried out by white officers. 
At the airport, the entry permit and the customs 
declaration were checked by an Australian; for 
someone registering a car then it was likely to be 
an Australian woman who provided the forms, 
took the money and issued the certificate; and in 
Konedobu (Waigani’s predecessor) many offices 
were run by white women and much routine 
administration was carried out by Australians. 
To enter the public service of the Territory then 
required an Australian leaving certificate or 
having qualified to enter an Australian university. 
In 1964 there were over 4000 expatriate officers 
in the First, Second and Third Divisions of the 
public service and 190 Papua New Guineans. 
There were another 1200 Papua New Guineans 
in the Auxiliary Division, set up for those who 
did not have the qualifications to get into the 
three divisions of the public service (Annual 
Report 1963-64, p.34). Even after the decisions 
to recruit Australians on contract only and give 
preference to Papua New Guineans, by 1972 there 
were 6,500 overseas officers employed under the 
Papua New Guinea public service ordinance. The 
  Government, States and Labels
8
conscientiously and those teachers (and others) 
who continue to meet community expectations 
— even when they do not get paid for months, 
requests are unanswered and their offices and 
accommodation are neglected.
the state and the fallIble 
ballot
The promotion of democracy — and here 
that will mean a government determined by each 
adult having a free and secret vote — is laudable. 
But it does not follow that a democratically 
elected government will be representative, 
efficient and have as its primary concern the 
welfare of the nation. And it is self-evident that 
a nation which suffers ‘endemic corruption’ and 
where the public service is ‘politicised’ and lacks 
capacity to ‘design and execute programs’ will 
have problems conducting an election efficiently 
and fairly. All of those terms describing the Papua 
New Guinea public service were used by the Asia 
Development Bank in its March 2006 assessment 
of Papua New Guinea. 
For an election to be free and fair there has 
to be an up-to-date and accurate electoral roll. It 
is the controlling basis. After the 1997 elections 
in Papua New Guinea, the Commonwealth 
Observer Group noted the inadequacy of the 
system of voter registration and the inaccuracy 
of voter registration, and in 2002, its successor, 
the Commonwealth Expert Group said that the 
‘worst aspect [of the election] was to do with 
the inaccuracy of the common roll’. The Expert 
Group complained that:
There were numerous references to names 
of under-aged registrants, ghost and 
phantom entries and multiple replications 
on the roll…. We were given reports that 
many people registered and voted multiple 
times in many locations (Report of the 
Commonwealth Expert Group).
Because the numbers on the rolls were greatly 
inflated, the Electoral Commission printed far too 
many ballot papers. This problem was magnified 
because the Commission thought it needed to 
be sure it had sufficient, so it added another 
15% to the already inflated figure. That meant 
a system without the safeguard of an accurate 
roll was awash with spare ballot papers. In some 
areas the discrepancy between voters and votes 
was absurd. As Philip Gibbs has pointed out 
there were 295,000 people in Enga according to 
the 2000 census and so we can assume that just 
over 160,000 were of voting age. In fact there 
were over 400,000 on the common roll and over 
317,000 votes were counted. That is, in spite 
of the fact that about 20% of registered voters 
did not vote, the number of votes still doubled 
the number of voters if the census is assumed 
to be accurate (Gibbs, p.5). After the failure of 
the 2002 elections in the Southern Highlands, 
special care was taken with the second election 
in 2003, but still, as Nicole Haley has explained, 
in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate 
there were sections of the electorate in which 
there were nearly three times more votes than 
voters (Haley, p.24). The worst case across a 
Province was that of Chimbu where nearly three 
votes were cast for each eligible voter.
While an accurate voter roll is basic, other 
and equally serious problems were listed by the 
AusAID review team: voters were denied privacy 
and coerced; ballot papers were stolen ‘often 
at gunpoint’, electoral officers and police were 
bribed or intimidated to accept ballot papers 
filled in unseen by officials, and ballot boxes of 
votes were stolen (AusAID, Review of Australia’s 
electoral assistance program to PNG, p.15). Again, 
there needs to be the reminder that most 
violence, fraud and failures of the roll occurred 
in the Highlands and that in many electorates 
elsewhere there may have been inefficiencies, 
but they were insufficient to change the election 
result. The Electoral Commission was in many 
ways more efficient than other sections of 
government, but inevitably it shares many of 
the same characteristics, and it has to operate in 
circumstances beyond its control. Clearly it is not 
the duty of Electoral Commission staff to remove 
guns from citizens, but its chances of conducting a 
fair election are slight where there are candidates 
supported by groups who outnumber and outgun 
the police.
Even if the Electoral Commission could run 
the election with competence and scrupulous 
public morality, the elected candidates do not 
represent majorities of citizens and are not 
committed to the implementation of national 
policies considered and approved by voters. The 
deficiencies are well known. In Papua New 
Guinea there are now no indigenous women 
members in the Parliament, and in the April 
2006 elections in Solomons not one of the 24 
women candidates could win a seat. Democracy 
has certainly failed the half of the population 
who are female. In Papua New Guinea in 2002 
an average of 26 candidates stood for each 
electorate, only one candidate got over 50% of 
the vote, and 20 gained less than 10%. Most 
candidates received less than 20% of the vote. 
Two-thirds of sitting candidates were defeated. 
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Over 40 parties contested the election and 
initially over 20 parties were represented in the 
House, although fourteen of these had only one 
or two members. All of these characteristics 
— growing numbers of candidates, more parties, 
lower winning percentages of votes and sitting 
members being defeated — have generally been 
increasing with each election. The legislative 
attempts to reverse these trends have had slight 
impact, and given that it will take a significant 
change to even halt the trends, the 2007 elections 
are likely to have many of the characteristics of 
the six elections that have taken place since 
Independence. And one trend is likely to be 
stimulated by the attempts to control voter, 
candidate and party behaviour by legislation: 
there will be an increased number of post-
election disputes taken to the courts. Already the 
vote is often seen as the preliminary to the court. 
This pushes the judicial system into the political 
process and makes it more likely to succumb to 
political influence and outright corruption.
Post-election, problems arise because a 
government has to be formed from many small 
parties and independents. As most of the members 
are new, the power of those few who have 
survived several elections and have either a party 
or a personal following in the House is increased. 
Given that parties have few members outside 
the parliament and that their election platform 
was written in the most general terms, any 
combination of parties is possible. Independents 
are also generally free of specific policy pledges so 
they too can coalesce around any individual or 
party. If a government is not formed on policies 
and a legislative program, then it is all the more 
likely that member allegiance will be obtained by 
promises of benefits to the member and those few 
who elected him. As members know that their 
chances of re-election are slight, and that they 
can do little for themselves or their electors while 
sitting on the opposition benches, they are keen 
to join the government and get what they can 
while they can. If they fail to join the winning 
side in the bargaining before the first sitting of 
the House, they are likely to join it soon after. At 
the first division on the election of the speaker 
the vote might be close, but within days the 
opposition will have dropped from over 40% of 
members to less than 20%.
Electors are generally not concerned about 
party membership or policy because they vote 
along clan or other locally important group 
lines. They are not worried about the health or 
education or transport policy: what they want 
is to be able to get more of their children into 
a school, they want access to an equipped and 
staffed medical facility, and they want a road built 
and maintained. Other aspirations are equally 
basic: they want law and order and more chances 
to make cash. If they can’t get peace and an 
end to corruption — and they may never have 
known a system without violence and unjust 
preferment — then they will settle for a system 
that advantages themselves and disadvantages 
their enemies. In these circumstances they may 
well vote for, and continue to return, a tough 
and aggressive local leader who may well have 
been condemned in a distant town for violating 
the leadership or criminal code. In the eyes of 
the electors, he is more likely to succeed in the 
rough and tumble of the election process, and he 
is more likely to ‘talk strong’ to the government 
and bring home approval for a Local Level 
Government building, money for school fees, 
and a Toyota Landcruiser. The tough and corrupt 
survivors in the Parliament will have influence 
among members — either independents or 
within parties or sections of parties. They will be 
among the contenders for the prime ministership 
and key ministries, and all who aspire to lead 
must deal with some of them. The result is that 
governments are from the start corrupted: they 
have had to attract and hold members with 
promises of government projects and positions, 
some of which may put cash in the hands of 
members, and they have had to deal with and 
include in the ministry members with a past 
record of corruption.10
Much more could be said about how the 
parliaments and public services operate. But just 
getting the members elected and a government in 
place reveals the problems involved in operating 
a democratic system in Papua New Guinea and 
more broadly in Melanesia. It appears that it is as 
easy to argue that law and order, an efficient public 
service and an electorate that is conscious of a 
national interest (in addition to particular group 
and regional interests) are essential preconditions 
for democracy as it is to claim that democracy is 
a precondition for a corruption-free, coherent 
nation with an efficient government pursuing 
policies in the national interest. It is certainly 
unrealistic to expect an electoral commission 
to have the funds, trained personnel, efficiency 
and nation-wide reach that is well beyond the 
resources and capacity of all other sections of 
government.
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the state and mIsconceptIons 
of ethnIcIty
Pacific 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Growth, an ‘initiative of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Hon. Alexander Downer’, was 
developed by AusAID and called for contributions 
from the most knowledgeable scholars in the 
Pacific (AusAID, Pacific 2020, p.xi). It poses the 
‘fundamental question’: ‘why doesn’t democracy 
serve the majority better?’ (AusAID, Pacific 2020, 
p.95). The authors say that there are two answers: 
‘clientelism’ and ‘fragmentation’. They go on 
to make clear that they are writing of ‘ethnic 
fragmentation’, and they see their two answers 
coming together as an ‘ethnic group leader 
becomes the patron’.11 Other commentators have 
found much ‘ethnic’ violence in Melanesia.
If ‘ethnic’ is given its normal meaning of a 
group identifiable because of race or culture, 
particularly language, then the term has been 
misused and it leads to a misleading analysis. In 
his summary study of warfare among the Mae 
Enga, Blood is the Argument, Mervyn Meggitt 
had evidence of some ‘84 known eruptions of 
violence’ between 1900 and 1950. These, he 
argued, should be called wars and not feuds, and 
they involved clans and sub-clans of the Mae 
Enga. The fighting could result in many deaths 
and with the defeated losing all or part of their 
lands (Meggitt, pp.13-14). Warfare then was, 
and now is, often between people of the same 
language and culture. Men of an Engan clan 
married women from another clan: a woman’s 
husband was (and is) often at war with her 
brothers. That pattern recurs in other parts of 
the Highlands.
Christopher Hallpike in his study of the 
Tauade, one of the Goilala language groups 
northwest of Port Moresby, concludes: ‘It does 
not follow … that any of these groups conceives 
of itself as a political or cultural unit, or that 
difference of language or custom on the border 
between two groups appears to produce any more 
hostility than is normal for this area’ (Hallpike, 
p.44). Other basic enthnographic studies make 
the point that the Orokaiva fought Orokaiva, 
and on Bougainville Siwai fought Siwai. Those 
on the margins negotiated alliances and attacks 
on their neighbours in much the same way as 
they did with people with whom they shared 
a culture. There were, as is usually the case in 
Melanesia, exceptions, so that some strong and 
expanding communities, although they might 
have fought among themselves, treated particular 
neighbours as lesser peoples who were always 
under threat of dispossession and death.
Trying to illustrate the many divisions within 
Melanesia, commentators often point to the 
fact that there are over 800 languages in Papua 
New Guinea. Languages are indeed an indicator 
of diversity; but that does not justify the slide 
from language groups to ethnic fragmentation 
and explanations of the political process. What 
confounds democracy in most electorates is not 
ethnicity, but smaller groups, often called clans 
and formed by people who have or assume a 
common ancestry. The 2878 candidates who 
stood for election in Papua New Guinea did 
not have much relationship with the 800 or 
so language groups, especially when the many 
small language groups are eliminated. (In the 
100 or so different languages of the Sepik-Ramu 
group about half of them have fewer than 500 
speakers.) In contemporary politics, there is often 
continuity between voting blocks and the groups 
that once came together in alliances of defence 
and aggression. In Enga province — where 
there is a dominance of the one language — in 
the 2002 elections there were 137 candidates 
contesting the five open seats. As Phillip Gibbs 
has pointed out, the problem for candidates was 
to maintain the base support of their home clan. 
That was not easy as candidates from the same 
clan, even subclan, sometimes stood against each 
other; and — as in warfare — wives (if given the 
chance to vote freely) may well have favoured 
someone from the clan they had left (Gibbs, 
pp.5-6). And while clans were important, other 
factors, such as personality, the capacity of the 
candidate to bring material benefits and religious 
affiliation, may also have been influential.
Ethnicity is also important. As Nicole Haley 
points out, in the 1997, 2002 and 2003 elections 
in Koroba-Kopiago in the Southern Highlands 
ethnicity was a ‘key electoral issue’ (Haley p.16). 
The electorate is dominated by the Huli (57%) 
and the Duna (37%), and includes smaller 
numbers of Bogaia and Hewa. In the failed 2002 
election 13 Huli and 6 Duna candidates stood: 
there were clear divisions within the two main 
ethnic groups. In the re-run of the election in 
2003 the Duna reduced their candidates to two 
in a conscious attempt to offset their numerical 
disadvantage. That is, ethnicity was a force for 
coherence not fragmentation. The majority Huli 
by dividing their vote among 10 candidates 
squandered their advantage. When the votes 
were counted a Duna candidate, Petrus Thomas, 
had won, but he had represented Papua New 
Guinea at Rugby League and had picked up 
votes among the Huli. Underlying ethnicity 
were smaller traditional groups and overlying it 
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were allegiances that came out of success in the 
modern world of education, business, church 
and sport. The optional preferential system now 
being re-introduced is likely to have as much 
impact on the clans and the new alliances as it 
is on ethnicity.
On Bougainville it is possible to see 
ethnic factors (the blackness of the skin of 
the Bougainvilleans being important in their 
identity) and elsewhere other large groups may 
have an ethnic basis when they leave home. 
Goilalas, Chimbus, Mekeos, Keremas and Sepiks 
have a sense of common identity in Port Moresby, 
something they may not feel back in the village 
— or the district headquarters. While the Mekeos 
and Goilalas each share a cultural heritage and 
can reasonably be called ethnic groups, Sepiks 
come from many different language groups and 
environments — from river to grasslands, to 
mountains and the coast. The notion of being a 
Sepik was created in colonial times and like being 
a Papuan is a result of lines on maps, centres of 
administration and imposed labels of identity.
To use the term ethnicity or to talk of ‘ethnic 
fragmentation’ is to misread the basic fissures 
and group consciousness of most Melanesians. 
Generally, the main cultural groups — the ethnic 
groups — have slight sense of political coherence, 
leaders do not consistently command loyalty 
from all the group, and even language groups of 
less than 5000 are likely to stand more than one 
candidate in an open electorate (McLeod, p.28).
the state as tarGet of the 
predatory cItIzens
For many communities the only accessible 
source of quick wealth, perhaps any wealth, is the 
state.12 If they are to participate in the growth and 
change that they see elsewhere, if they are to send 
their children to school, get their sick to hospital 
or buy a four-wheel drive, they must rely on 
‘government’, and if their elected representatives 
and public servants are unlikely to provide, they 
may turn to a known alternative. At any given 
time central and provincial governments are 
likely to be facing claims for ‘compensation’. In 
August 2005 the hydroelectric plants supplying 
Port Moresby were shut down, forcing the capital 
to rely on its thermal generators. Port Moresby’s 
water supply was also reduced as Edu Ranu, the 
water supply agency, draws supply from the same 
dam. An aggressive group of Koiari landowners 
had gathered at the Rouna hydroelectricity 
station and forced its workers to shut it down. 
They demanded K37 .5 million for the use of 
their lands for the dams and stations, the payment 
back-dated to 1953 (National, 23 August 2005). 
A few weeks later at Yarapos near Wewak, the 
villagers demanded compensation of K500,000 
for the damage done to their environment by 
the AusAID funded work on the local secondary 
school (Post-Courier, 28 October 2005). In other 
recent claims the Bunga Land Group took court 
action for K34 million for lands on which the 
Bulolo township is built; former members of the 
Fly River provincial government were granted 
and then lost K20.5 million in compensation 
for loss of salaries and other entitlements; and 
in Lae the Ahi have made claims and supported 
them by threatening to shut down power and gas 
(National, 3 March 2006) and the Labu villagers 
have demanded half of the land from the old 
Lae airstrip, joint venture partnership in major 
developments in the city, the right to provide 
security at the Lae market, a share of the revenue 
from the Lae wharf, and other compensation for 
the loss of land, shore and sea (National, 13 April 
2006).13
Some claims have long histories, going back 
to the earliest alienation of coastal lands late in 
the nineteenth century. In the days of Australian 
rule, sub-district offices might retain notes to 
warn new kiaps that certain groups would resurrect 
particular claims. The government might have 
thought such issues were long settled, but the 
villagers, or perhaps a section of a village, did 
not think so, and took every chance to restate 
their case. Some claims were and are completely 
bogus, some have a slight basis in a real grievance 
but have suffered a hundred or a thousand fold 
inflation, and others may be justified. In the 
destructive cases in the Solomon Islands any 
money lodged in the treasury was immediately 
taken out by those who got there early, made 
aggressive demands for ‘compensation’ and were 
backed by armed supporters. In some instances the 
groups making the demands may be expressing a 
more general dissatisfaction. This could be the 
case with the Koiari.
The Mountain Koiari living on the Sogeri 
Plateau through the Kokoda Trail area to the 
edge of Oro Province number about 4000, and 
the distant people in the north may have slight 
association with those in the south. Those Koiari 
living closest to the Rouna hydroelectricity 
stations may feel themselves under pressure from 
the Goilala and other groups who have been 
moving to lands where they can grow products to 
sell in the Port Moresby markets and get access 
to other goods and services in and around the 
capital. Also, Southern Highlanders who were 
introduced to the Sogeri area as workers on the 
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rubber plantations under the Highland Labour 
Scheme have stayed, and other people have 
developed businesses along the road leading 
to Port Moresby. The Koiari, few in number, 
may feel themselves under-pressure from, and 
being surpassed by, outsiders: their claim asserts 
ownership and demonstrates power, and provides 
a means for aspiring leaders to show that they can 
advance the welfare and prestige of the group. 
The very theatre of confrontation, the shutting 
down of the stations and reports in the media 
achieve some of these aims, and even a partial 
victory in the courts would further justify the 
actions of the Koiari Landowners Group. In fact, 
the Koiari protests did result in some gains for 
them. In the upgrade of pipes announced in June, 
the Koiari were granted preference in skilled and 
unskilled employment and they were allowed 
to retain equipment and machinery used in the 
project (National, 3 June 2006).
The case in Kagua in the Southern Highlands 
is grand in scale and complexity. Edward Etepa 
and 551 other members of the Kome group assert 
that during the 2002 national elections a dispute 
broke out when an election official marked a 
ballot paper against the wishes of a voter. Violence 
spread, dragging in the Kome who became the 
victims of stronger communities: the Kome were 
dispersed, finding refuge among distant peoples 
and losing land, gardens homes, animals, sacred 
sites and burial grounds. They made a precise 
calculation of their losses, added exemplary 
damages, interest and costs and submitted a 
claim for K68,950,933. The reputable legal firm 
of Warner Shand presented their case in the Mt 
Hagen court. The defendants named are not 
the tribesmen who attacked the Kome, but the 
state, the police and the electoral commission 
officers who were said to have failed to prevent 
the election being taken over by the armed 
supporters of particular candidates and failed to 
suppress the subsequent violence (National 21 
October 2005).
The claims against the government have 
to be seen against the many other demands for 
compensation made against companies (most 
notably the K10 billion claim pressed by Francis 
Ona and the Panguna Landowners’ Association 
against CRA in 1987) and against groups and 
individuals. On Bougainville the demands are 
now for compensation to be made a precondition 
of the return of miners. This seems to include 
compensation for those who started the war. In 
the Southern Highlands the advocates of a Hela 
province have laid down a different condition: 
‘No Hela Province — No PNG gas project’ 
(National, 11 April 2006). Obviously, demands 
for compensation are common where violence 
has been frequent. In October 2005 the Tendepo 
people of the Upper Tambul in the Western 
Highlands paid K31,000 in cash, 142 pigs, five 
cows, two horses, three cuscus and one cassowary 
to the Yano. In the fighting, high-powered 
weapons had been used, eighteen people killed, 
more than 2000 driven from their homelands 
and much damage done to property. But the 
compensation payment made did not cover these 
main losses which were suffered by the Tendepo 
who were fighting among themselves but to the 
Yano who had almost accidentally been drawn 
into the fight. The ceremony and payments in 
the Upper Tambul were significant in bringing a 
measure of peace and making public the extent of 
the violence, but the money and goods that then 
changed hands did little for most clans who had 
lost heavily in lives and property.
Some compensation payments between 
groups may calm the angry and bring peace, 
and there may be no hope of ending a feud 
without a compensation payment; but many 
people recognise that compensation payments, 
increasing in size and frequency, are destructive; 
that compensation is pursued more successfully by 
the politically powerful and aggressive; and that 
the lure of compensation or the sudden influx of 
a compensation payment into a community may 
be a cause of violence.
Demands for compensation are certainly 
damaging for states wrestling with a variety of 
law and order problems, few resources to carry 
out the most basic tasks, and public servants 
vulnerable to corruption and with limited 
power and confidence when faced with the 
politically strong. The claims for compensation 
impede the capacity of the state to provide the 
essential infrastructure of roads, schools, airstrips, 
electricity pylons or even mountain top stations 
for electronic communications. They break the 
contract between people who pay taxes and accept 
other imposts and restraints in return for services. 
The ‘government’ is seen as possessing wealth and 
advantage, and they can be captured by election 
and by other strategies. One of the simplest 
strategies, and the one open to distant and small 
groups, is to press a claim with a plausible legal 
basis. Among the many competitive families and 
clans who measure their rise and fall in the world 
relative to close neighbours, a compensation 
payment for land lost, trees cut down or a garden 
spoiled by the land fill from a road cutting 
has greater immediate value than the promised 
advantage of the government service that might 
be of more value to competitors. And it is better 
to seek compensation from the government than 
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traditional enemies: the government has more 
money, the groups can unite against it, and it is 
less likely to retaliate.
Where the compensation payments are made 
to stronger individuals and groups close to centres 
of government, then the amounts are greater and 
the results more destructive. They set patterns 
of citizens locating an asset of the state and 
attempting to transfer it to their own hands; 
they encourage politicians and public servants 
to combine to defraud the state; and because the 
amounts are large they allow corrupting payments 
to collaborators. Sometimes the schemes are 
blatant and close to straight out robbery or 
extortion, but some are inventive and quickly 
repeated by others. The result is a state with 
diminished resources, a public service corrupted, 
some rich citizens who invest elsewhere, and a 
broader public with a cynical view of the state 
and its capacity to act justly, efficiently and to 
the advantage of the public. There may even be 
an increase in competition to strip the state of its 
resources.
The state described here is different from 
the kleptocracies and predatory states that have 
arisen in Africa. Measured in terms of brute 
power and ruthlessness, these were and are 
strong regimes able to prey upon their citizens, 
or selected groups of citizens. By contrast, some 
people attempting — and sometimes succeeding 
— in taking wealth from the Melanesian states 
are numerically and politically weak.
Governments of opportunIty 
for the plausIble roGues and 
IdealIsts
Even before central governments were 
created, New Guinea was a target of the plausible 
rogues. Charles Bonaventure du Breuil, known 
in the history of New Guinea as the Marquis 
de Rays, began his plans for a colony in New 
Ireland in the late 1870s (Biskup, p.8). He was a 
visionary, perhaps mentally deluded, completely 
impractical and a ruthless swindler. He has 
had many successors, and they come in various 
concentrations of those characteristics. They 
arrived throughout the years of Australian rule, 
and one or two, such as Errol Flynn, who left debts 
and broken hearts, later exploited their winsome 
ways to do well in the world (Moore). They have 
continued to land in Papua New Guinea. They 
might be Australian businessmen who claim royal 
titles and travel in private unscheduled aircraft to 
Bougainville or they might be the representatives 
of an African telecommunications company 
ready to possess a privatised Papua New Guinea 
system. They may arrive with what appear to be 
the highest references and an apparent record 
of achievement. The embattled and reclusive 
Francis Ona on Bougainville was rarely without 
foreign advisers and people able to shape his 
communication with the world. Some advisers 
briefly become well known, such as Mujo Sefa 
who in 1997 became famous because he filmed 
his boss, Prime Minister Bill Skate, talking 
freely in a tired and emotional state of his raskol 
exploits (Nelson, p.261). Another who gained 
passing fame or notoriety at about the same time 
was Pirouz Hamidian-Rad. He had been the 
World Bank’s team leader in Papua New Guinea, 
but after both the Chan and Skate governments 
had quarrelled with the Bank, Skate suddenly 
appointed Hamidian-Rad as the economic 
adviser to cabinet (Dorney 2000, p.78). With a 
contract worth K7 million, Hamidian-Rad set 
about introducing policies which seemed certain 
to make a chaotic economy even worse. This led 
to a number of offers from people who said that 
they were prepared to give bad advice at a lower 
rate.
Although the groups may overlap, a distinction 
needs to be made between the plausible rogues 
and those ruthless businessmen and mobsters 
who wish to set up brothels or gambling dens 
or exploit timber and mineral resources for 
outrageous profit. The unscrupulous businessmen 
may have a single aim, and while they have 
every intention of acting illegally they are likely 
to be practical. Other overlapping groups have 
come out of single-issue political movements 
overseas, or churches or other and more marginal 
organisations. Having established themselves in 
Melanesia as advisers on one issue, they may 
move to a wider role. The plausible, visionary 
rogues offer advice over a range of policies, and 
they operate at provincial and central government 
levels. Their time of ascendancy may be brief, but 
they are followed by others. We might expect 
the self-deluded, romantic swindler to turn up 
in Honiara or Wewak or Broome or Darwin. 
These are places of last resort, and they tolerate 
the lost and eccentric. But it is more difficult 
to explain why they obtain influence. Some are 
certainly very good at establishing close relations 
with Melanesians — they are better at this than 
many of those able to provide sound advice. And 
they appear to offer quick, easy and home-grown 
solutions. There is the misleading impression 
that what is being presented is, or will be, a truly 
Melanesian solution. It is advice that appeals to 
those being scolded by overseas institutions and 
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governments for their inefficiency, corruption 
and failure to meet targets. It is advice that offers 
a change from the repetition that progress will be 
slow and dependent on Melanesians taking tough 
decisions and inflicting pain before securing 
modest the long-term gain.
the state and the myth of 
neutral InterventIon
From their first arrival, foreigners had a 
profound impact on the old balances in 
Melanesian communities. Directions of trade and 
the commodities in trade changed. People who 
had access to stone quarries, had developed skills 
as stone workers and exchanged their products 
widely found that demand disappeared. The 
potters, salt-makers and canoe-makers also lost 
much of their trade; the sorcerers were more able 
to retain value in their specialist knowledge and 
skills. Economic advantage went to those who 
could trade the new commodities (steel tools, 
fish hooks, enamel pots and matches) to people 
without easy access to foreigners and their goods; 
to those who could enter the new institutions 
as pastors, police and labour overseers (bosbois); 
and those who could join the cash economy 
because they had a market for their goods or 
they could sign on as labourers on plantations, 
mining fields and in the towns. For some who lost 
land, the economic advantage of proximity to a 
source of new wealth outweighed the economic 
loss, but others simply lost. Disease, more than 
violence, changed population balances. In small-
scale communities the loss of just four or five 
key fighting men could change local balances 
of power; the loss of ten could destroy a clan’s 
capacity to defend itself. Just why some of the 
population changes were so great is unclear. 
Woodlark and Misima Island had broadly similar 
histories of contact with goldminers, planters, 
missionaries and government officers all having 
their influence. Soon after 1900, both islands 
had populations of around 2,500, but by the 
1930s there were 3000 on Misima and 800 on 
Woodlark and by self-government there were 
about 6000 on Misima to 1200 on Woodlark 
(Nelson 1976, pp.45-46 and 72.). People whose 
dialect was the one chosen by missionaries to be 
used as the basis for translations were handed a 
cultural advantage; and that advantage increased 
for those whose language became a lingua franca 
of mission or government.
Inevitably, the foreigners arrived at an 
arbitrary point in the local cycle of wars, religious 
movements, disease and natural events such 
as drought, flood, mudslides, and plant pests. 
Relative strengths tended to be fixed at the 
time that the colonial government established 
its authority: the recently defeated saw their 
enemies confirmed in possession of lands they had 
just been forced to flee, and the confident and 
expanding clans saw their ambitions thwarted. 
Individuals and communities immediately began 
to manipulate and influence the foreigners to 
their advantage. One of the misconceptions of 
foreigners at pacification, particularly in those 
areas where there was extensive fighting, was that 
the basic division was between villagers and the 
colonial power. In fact, that was rarely the case. In 
the Northern Division (later Oro Province) in the 
late 1890s and early 1900s when colonial officers 
used the vocabulary of war and forty Orokaiva and 
Binandere warriors died in single battles between 
riflemen and spearmen, many villagers thought 
that their permanent self-interest was their 
relative wealth and strength measured against 
their traditional rivals and allies. They aided the 
government forces against their clan enemies, and 
quickly realised that they had to have influence 
and power within the government. Those trying 
to use government power to their own advantage 
volunteered as guides and carriers, and soon they 
were working as interpreters and police (Nelson 
1976, chapt 9).
Determining who were winners and losers 
following the intervention of foreigners could 
require fine calculation. When a mission teacher 
arrived in a village he might make initial contact 
with a clan or subclan and that could then 
determine whose land became the site of the first 
church, and whose children were first educated 
by the mission. In the village it would be 
recognised that the church ‘belonged’ more to 
some than to others, and that some had a greater 
right to speak for the church than others. The 
location of roads, government rest houses and 
schools, and the appointment of individuals 
as village officials all increased the relative 
prestige and/or material advantage of families 
and clans. In intensely competitive small scale 
communities there were always ambitious men 
seeking to replace established leaders and clans 
measuring their strength against others, and 
every new venture — a cooperative store, a local 
government council, a coffee plantation or a 
women’s club — offered comparative gains and 
losses.
Since Independence all foreign intervention 
has continued to bring greater benefits to some 
rather than others. This has been true whether 
the intervention has been at the level of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
 Government, States and Labels
15
(RAMSI) or the provision of a water supply to 
a remote village. The Apex Club members who 
supplied the pipes and did much of the work can 
reasonably think that the water supply is to the 
advantage of all residents of the village. But one 
individual or family can claim to have made the 
connection with the Apexians, to have provided 
most food for the visitors and had the tap placed 
on their land. One day, someone might be unwise 
to boast about how they brought the water, 
and a little later the pipes are vandalised and 
left unrepaired. The water supply might have 
benefited all, but it benefited some more than 
others.
Where there is a major intervention in the 
capital, then the very demands that have led to 
the intervention will mean that the government is 
in urgent need of reform: poor decisions will have 
been made, some elected members of government 
will have been grossly incompetent or corrupt, 
and various key institutions from the treasury 
to the police will have been implicated. But the 
incoming force will have to work with some of 
the compromised leaders, particularly where the 
intervention is based on the convenient fiction 
or reality that it has arrived at the request of the 
legitimate government. It would seem absurd for 
an intervening force to claim its power rested on 
a request of a government which it stripped of 
power. And as with the arrival of the colonial 
power a century or so earlier, those who are in 
ascendant at the time of the intervention and do 
not choose violent confrontation are likely to be 
the winners.
the state wIth volatIle cItIes
In April 2006 Honiara was suddenly taken 
over by mobs and much of Chinatown was burnt. 
In spite of the presence of RAMSI force there 
was no prior intelligence and given the speed and 
intensity of mob action initial police response 
could only be directed towards saving those most 
under threat. Through the first hours, there was 
no chance of suppressing the rioters or arresting 
of leaders. A few days later, Dili was in turmoil 
as soldiers who had been dismissed from the 
army were joined by disaffected young men keen 
to burn and loot. In his book on the Sandline 
Affair, Sean Dorney heads the chapter on events 
in Port Moresby in March 1997, ‘Days of Havoc’ 
(Dorney 2001, pp.287-308). From the first coup 
led by Sitiveni Rabuka in 1987, control of Suva 
has been critical in the making and unmaking of 
governments. The coups and attempted coups 
in Suva are different because of the division 
between Indo-Fijians and Fijians and the power 
of the armed forces to carry out or thwart coups. 
In Fiji, it is not the sudden mobilisation of people 
within the town that redirects national politics. 
But that aside, the volatile towns have been, and 
will be, significant in national politics.
The speed with which the mob assembles 
and shifts from shouting to violence is surprising 
because it is in apparent defiance of the geography 
of the towns and the lack of political beliefs and 
organisation of those involved. The towns tend 
to be spread out, with concentrations here and 
there. In Port Moresby it is over ten kilometres 
from Gerehu to Boroko and another six to the 
old centre of town; and the parliament house, 
blockaded by protesters in the Sandline affair, 
is separated from the closest residential areas of 
Waigani, Morata and Tokarara. There are no 
narrow streets lined by multi-storeyed tenements. 
There are no extremist parties of the left or right 
to call out the bother boys and provide them with 
an ideology and justification. No one charismatic 
leader has the ability to attract and fire up the 
mob. And all of that makes the mob much less 
predictable.
In the Melanesian towns there are 
disproportionate numbers of young men; they 
are unemployed or underemployed; and many 
have associations with each other through their 
place of origin, the suburb or squatter camp in 
which they live, or because they are in or on 
the margins of raskol gangs, or they are in looser 
groups who knock around together. The young 
men may not have a coherent political program 
and only vague ideas of who their enemies might 
be, but they have general grievances arising 
from their poverty, their few opportunities to 
better themselves, resentment at the conspicuous 
wealth of a few (many of whom are foreigners) 
and at the corruption and inefficiency that they 
see around them. Political and other leaders, 
who are connected to them by opportunism and 
ethnicity, are certainly ready to exploit them in 
elections or at other times when they need an 
intimidating show of support; but apart from an 
immediate aim to secure a position, overturn a 
decision or unseat an opponent, the politicians 
and the mob have only the broadest of aims in 
common.
The young men have no vested interest in 
the town: they themselves own little, most do 
not think of themselves as belonging to the town, 
and their families have no stake in business or 
property in the town. There is no countervailing 
force of a strong middle class. Many rioters 
will not be condemned by those in their home 
communities, whether they come from a poor 
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suburb or a distant village. Some police, army 
and men from private security firms are likely 
to join the protest, adding to the chance that 
firearms will be used. Several times, Port Moresby 
students have resorted to violent protest, on 
one occasion at the University of Papua New 
Guinea setting up road blocks and torching a 
dozen government vehicles. Except for student 
allowances, examinations and other issues of 
immediate importance to students, the campus is 
most likely to be in turmoil when basic questions 
such as land are being debated. In combination 
with teachers college and other students, the 
university students can be formidable, and 
have forced change on the government. An 
alliance of students, unemployed, raskols, 
disaffected members of the uniformed services 
and unprincipled politicians could quickly cause 
havoc; but because of the dispersed nature of 
Port Moresby and many other Melanesian towns 
it would be likely that parts of the town would 
be by-passed, other towns would not be affected 
and most rural areas would be untroubled and 
unconcerned. The parliament of a nation or a 
province could be under siege, without the ‘state’ 
being at risk. But the implications for foreign 
governments might be immediate if they have 
their own nationals under threat — or being 
killed.
the state wIth patches of 
peace and proGress
For many Melanesians, the single-word 
descriptions applied to their nation have no 
relationship with their own home districts. That 
should be no surprise to anyone who has looked 
at the variation in basic indicators across national 
maps. In Papua New Guinea, for example, in 
Central, East New Britain, Manus and Milne 
Bay over 85% of those aged seven to twelve are 
enrolled in schools. By contrast in the Southern 
Highlands about 50% are in the schools, and 
that probably overstates the number. Where 80% 
or more of the people in Manus and East New 
Britain are literate, in Enga, Southern Highlands 
and the Western Highlands less than 38% are 
literate. Even within provinces there are sharp 
differences so that in East New Britain districts 
range from among the most advantaged in terms 
of income, access to services and child health 
(Gazelle) to those who are among the most 
disadvantaged (Pomio) (Hansen, Table 9). 
History has added to the diversity influenced 
by geography. At independence some groups had 
had over 75 years of colonial rule and mission 
teaching and no one could remember a time 
when there was no central government and no 
church. Some families had three generations who 
were literate. But at independence nearly a third 
of Papua New Guineans had had no more than a 
generation of representatives of state and church 
in their villages. They were then lightly touched 
by and lightly connected to the outside world, 
and their values were predominantly those from 
before contact. Even had the impossible happened 
and Melanesian communities encountered a 
uniform foreign force they would have had 
varied histories. Their own values, practices, 
numbers and economies differed greatly so that 
some people would have immediately reached an 
accommodation, others fought openly and briefly 
and yet others sustained a long, intermittent 
guerrilla resistance. As it was, all of that happened 
within a few miles of Port Moresby. The map of 
Melanesia is a patchwork of cultural groups, 
most without political cohesion, and history has 
sharpened those differences as much as it has 
increased consciousness of the wider group and 
provided experiences in common.
The result has been that even when conditions 
have appeared at their most bleak (while war was 
going on in Bougainville, Honiara immediately 
before the arrival of RAMSI Force, Port Moresby 
at the time of the Sandline riots and during the 
last months of the Skate government) many 
provinces and parts of provinces have been 
untouched — or, as in the Southern Highlands, 
been engaged in greater troubles of their own. 
There are always areas where there is peace, where 
public buildings such as churches are painted and 
maintained, and people have a sense of progress: 
more people have canoes or dinghies powered 
by outboard motors and houses made of milled 
timber, more children are going away for higher 
education, and there is an increasing knowledge 
of, and connection with, a wider world — 
evident in the number who speak English or tok 
pisin. The areas of peace and progress vary (in the 
mid 1980s Bougainville would have been seen as 
one of the most successful of the provinces), but 
some districts (such as much of Milne Bay) have 
consistently been free of turmoil. Too often the 
areas of peace and/or progress are simply noted as 
exceptions; but they are both quantitatively and 
politically significant.
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conclusIons
The convenient single- and two-word 
summaries — at-risk, weak, fragile, broken-
backed, failed — tell us little about Melanesian 
states. Beginning slowly in the 1880s and 
accelerating in the 1930s through to the 1960s, 
the state came to different peoples at different 
times. It was often intermittent and limited 
in function. By the end of the colonial period 
almost no villages had electricity, water on tap, a 
postal service, or a policeman and about half had 
a school. Because different peoples responded 
in different ways to ‘government’, people have 
had varied relationships with the state, ranging 
from a rapid accommodation to a long guerrilla 
war. For some people the church (introduced, 
their own or a hybrid) has always been more 
important than the government in providing 
services, linking them to a wider community and 
explaining the rest of the world to them. For 
nearly all peoples ‘government’ in the colonial 
and post-colonial state has been imposed, enticed 
or captured: it has almost never been a result of 
policy debate, decision by democratically elected 
representatives and its imposts and benefits 
imposed universally. Governments, like mines, 
logging companies and plantations, result in 
advantage and handicap.
A starting point in any attempt to help 
Melanesian nations provide good government for 
their citizens is an understanding of those states 
as they are now. There can be no obliteration of 
the past and present and a new start. Theories 
and classifications imported from elsewhere may 
be informative, but they will never be sufficient. 
If the characteristics of the state are close to 
what has been briefly described then it seems 
likely that:
•	 Free, democratic elections will not 
automatically lead to better government. 
A nation-wide election is a complex 
operation, and a state that extends no 
other services nationwide will have 
difficulty establishing an accurate roll and 
conducting an election. The candidates 
are likely to be elected by, and seen to 
represent, a small minority in the electorate, 
candidates found to have acted corruptly 
and scandalously in the capital will be re-
elected by their home constituents, and 
favours, rather than party affiliation or 
policies, will bind governments together. 
Governments that should stand against 
corruption are themselves corrupting.
•	 With many people outside the state 
or receiving few services from the state, a 
crisis leading to a paralysis of government 
in Port Moresby or the occasional decline 
and suspension of a provincial government 
is inconvenient rather than disastrous for 
most villagers.
•	 Given the inability of many 
government departments and agencies to 
carry out basic functions — such as keep 
files on employees and pay and promote 
them — there is not much point expecting 
them to implement a major reorganisation 
or a re-direction of policy. And there is a 
chance that a concentration on policy will 
take the attention of the most able senior 
members of a department, absorb limited 
resources, and further limit performance. 
The urgent need is to ensure that a public 
service section is able to carry out the 
function that that section was established 
to do. 
•	 If liberal democracy, capitalism 
and free market histories are the end of 
history, then the Melanesian states still 
have much history to travel (Fukuyama). 
An immediate, nominal imposition of 
the end, or a part of the end, is not going 
to benefit most citizens. The immediate 
need is for the Melanesian states to ensure 
that their history includes incremental 
steps to improve the lot of their peoples 
as they head towards constantly evolving 
ends of as yet ill-defined free, liberal and 
prosperous nations.
•	 In states where in the past the assets 
of government have been captured by 
some, where the government is almost the 
only source of wealth or means to social or 
economic advance, and where predatory 
citizens aim to transfer government capital 
to their private accounts, then overseas 
aid is likely to be a target of groups and 
individuals. Leaders may well be measured 
by their success in directing goods and 
services to the few and not to all.
•	 If there are many people living 
beyond the reach of the state — residents 
in the optional state, or who receive 
few state services, or are serviced by an 
alternate state — then there needs to be 
a new conception of what a state is. It is 
not something that runs from border to 
border, and it does not provide services 
for all its citizens. Currently, Papua New 
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Guinea provides no schools for a quarter 
of children of primary school age. While 
that particular fact is well known, what 
it means for the conception of the state 
that does so little for so many citizens is 
unclear. The state simply does not, and 
cannot, treat citizens equally.
•	 There has been much comment on 
weaknesses of government at the national, 
the provincial and local level. There has 
been less concern with the traditional or 
customary systems of government at the 
village level. But it was those systems 
that made most decisions for most people 
through the colonial period, and they are 
still significant in spite of the range of 
church and government officers who have 
been appointed. For many people, problems 
of law and order are more a result of the 
failure of the customary system, and less a 
failure of the various levels of introduced 
government. Those commentators who 
have called for a welding together of the 
customary and introduced governments 
may well be right, but they should be 
aware that the customary system is in need 
of repair. An efficient imposed system will 
not be enough.
•	 A well-resourced and efficient police 
service may well be a prerequisite of law 
and order. But the securing of more than 
a temporary condition of law and order 
while the police are actually present is 
dependent on an effective system of local 
government, and neither the introduced 
nor customary system is currently able to 
provide that.
•	 The towns are likely to continue to 
be sites of sudden violence. Because of the 
speed with which the mob gathers, the 
opportunistic alliances that are involved, 
the lack of formal organisation and the 
absence of political aims beyond the 
immediate, the authorities are unlikely to 
have much warning.
•	 The rise of an unscrupulous leader 
able to unite the restless and disaffected in 
the towns behind a coherent program of 
rebellion could happen quickly, but while 
that might result in the destruction of 
property, lives and a government, much of 
the rest of the nation will remain largely 
untouched.
•	 Outside donors who have wanted to 
get aid to people have used non-government 
agencies, and companies wishing to invest 
in the Melanesian states have taken over 
the functions of government. In the case 
of emergencies, such as a natural disaster, 
it may be necessary to use whatever 
means are available to get help to those 
in need, and it is hard to argue against a 
mining company providing services when 
a community would otherwise go without, 
but there is no doubt that the state and 
nation are diminished by the provision of 
basic services by other means. Aid programs 
are being developed to strengthen the 
state and the sense of nationalism while 
those services that might come through 
the state come by other means. This is 
clearly contradictory.
•	 There is always alternative advice 
being given. It may be from plausible rogues, 
or from single issue political movements or 
churches or what may be seen as extremist 
movements in their country of origin. 
Those who present a well-argued case for 
what might be practical and well-founded 
advice, should not be surprised when it is 
not immediately accepted. 
•	 Concessions to particular groups who 
make aggressive demands for compensation 
are destructive of the notion of the state’s 
obligations to treat all citizens equally, and 
they encourage further demands for special 
treatment.
•	 Outside intervention, whether a 
small scale project to help one village or 
an international force to rescue a state, 
is never neutral. Some people gain and 
others lose. In small-scale competitive 
communities where people constantly 
measure themselves against others, those 
rises and falls in fortune are closely 
observed and keenly felt.
•	 Many of the long term grievances 
of people are concerned with land — in 
Port Moresby, Lae, Madang, Mt Hagen, 
the Gazelle Peninsula, and so on. This is 
land that was alienated many years ago, 
its sale has often been reconsidered, and 
it still leads to violent confrontations. 
This is a clear warning to those who think 
that legislation and titles may solve land 
questions.
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•	 The reporting of turmoil, crime, 
corruption and government inefficiency 
always overwhelms any recognition of the 
extensive areas of peace and progress. Some 
areas of low income and few government 
services are among the most peaceful. The 
increased economic opportunities that the 
people want and have a right to pursue can 
come at social cost.
The aim in setting out characteristics of the 
Melanesian state has been to go beyond the brief 
and superficial descriptions that are frequently 
applied. If others add and amend, then it should 
be possible to establish defensible generalisations, 
and at the same time say something about what 
is increasing and decreasing and what forces are 
driving change.
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endnotes 
1 This paper was presented at a State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia seminar on 18 May 2006 
at the Australian National University.
2 The United Nations has suggested that Papua New 
Guinea be downgraded from ‘developing country’ to 
‘least developed country’. The Prime Minister reacted 
sharply to the change in classification (National, 10 
May 2006).
3 R.J.May, ‘Weak States, Collapsed States, Broken-
Backed States and Kleptocracies: General Concepts 
and Pacific Realities’, in The New Pacific Review: 
La Nouvelle Revue Du Pacifique: L’Etat des Etats — 
Pacific Island States Today, Vol 2 No 1, 2003, pp.35-
58, follows the same introduction by using Tinker 
— perhaps indicative of our shared introduction to 
the topic. May also gives an excellent summary of 
subsequent main conceptions of the post-colonial 
state, most based on African experience.
4 The Contribution of Australian Aid to Papua New 
Guinea’s development 1975-2000, Evaluation and 
Review Series No 34, June 2003, AusAID, Canberra, 
p.9 says that less than 70% rural aid posts were 
operating in 1999.
5 ‘Theocracy’ was normally used ironically or with 
conscious exaggeration.
6 See also the report on the road block at Konapugl 
directed against Pangia people (National, 28 April 
2006); and the road blocks on the Sialum Highway 
were said to be by ‘gun-wielding criminals’ acting in 
defiance of local leaders (National, 19 April 2006).
7 Philip Kapai at a rally in Banz said that the people 
of Jiwaka were ‘peace loving’ (National, 27 April 
2006).
8 The repaired Popondetta secondary school was 
damaged by fire, and much new equipment lost 
(National, 7 Feb 2006).
9 Note the recent complaint of the Papua New Guinea 
Teachers Association Sandaun branch which 
claimed that there was ‘no proper recording or filing 
of information on salaries in the province’ (National, 
2 June 2006).
10 This was written before the general scene presented 
here was repeated twice in Solomon Islands.
11 The Contribution of Australian Aid to Papua New 
Guinea’s development 1975-2000, p.10, writes of 
‘ethno-political groups each with its own distinctive 
cultural attributes’. It is not clear what the ‘distinctive 
cultural attributes’ one clan might have to distinguish 
it from another.
12 Peter Ekeh, a Nigerian, has made the point that 
many Africans think it is legitimate to rob the state 
to benefit the traditional or ‘primoidal’ group. The 
argument here is that the state is often the only 
source of the means for the group to transform itself 
by gaining the services of the state and the wealth 
that they see in the hands of a few. They are not 
so much strengthening the traditional group, but 
aiming to modernise or give brief privilege to a small 
part of it.
13 At Mt Hagen the landowners near a treatment 
plant ‘have again’ shut down the water supply 
because they said they had not received payment 
for the land (National, 28 April 2006). The Motu 
Koita Council said that the payments made to the 
Council were insufficient to cover their losses of 
land and resources taken for the development of the 
city of Port Moresby. They were ‘beggars in our own 
land’ (National, 27 April 2006). In Madang, Banim 
villagers have threatened to shut off the water supply 
claiming that the treatment plants pollutes local 
water (Post-Courier, 20 April 2006). Radio Southern 
Highlands has been off the air from March 2006 
because the people on whose land the transmitter 
is built have demanded compensation (National, 14 
June 2006).
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